KasperskyOS Community Edition 1.1
- What's new
- About KasperskyOS Community Edition
- Overview of KasperskyOS
- Getting started
- Development for KasperskyOS
- Starting processes
- File systems and network
- Contents of the VFS component
- Creating an IPC channel to VFS
- Building a VFS executable file
- Merging a client and VFS into one executable file
- Overview: arguments and environment variables of VFS
- Mounting a file system at startup
- Using VFS backends to separate file calls and network calls
- Writing a custom VFS backend
- IPC and transport
- KasperskyOS API
- libkos library
- Overview of the libkos library
- Memory
- Memory allocation
- Threads
- KosThreadCallback()
- KosThreadCallbackRegister()
- KosThreadCallbackUnregister()
- KosThreadCreate()
- KosThreadCurrentId()
- KosThreadExit()
- KosThreadGetStack()
- KosThreadOnce()
- KosThreadResume()
- KosThreadSleep()
- KosThreadSuspend()
- KosThreadTerminate()
- KosThreadTlsGet()
- KosThreadTlsSet()
- KosThreadWait()
- KosThreadYield()
- Handles
- Notifications
- Processes
- Dynamically created channels
- Synchronization primitives
- KosCondvarBroadcast()
- KosCondvarDeinit()
- KosCondvarInit()
- KosCondvarSignal()
- KosCondvarWait()
- KosCondvarWaitTimeout()
- KosEventDeinit()
- KosEventInit()
- KosEventReset()
- KosEventSet()
- KosEventWait()
- KosEventWaitTimeout()
- KosMutexDeinit()
- KosMutexInit()
- KosMutexInitEx()
- KosMutexLock()
- KosMutexLockTimeout()
- KosMutexTryLock()
- KosMutexUnlock()
- KosRWLockDeinit()
- KosRWLockInit()
- KosRWLockRead()
- KosRWLockTryRead()
- KosRWLockTryWrite()
- KosRWLockUnlock()
- KosRWLockWrite()
- KosSemaphoreDeinit()
- KosSemaphoreInit()
- KosSemaphoreSignal()
- KosSemaphoreTryWait()
- KosSemaphoreWait()
- KosSemaphoreWaitTimeout()
- DMA buffers
- IOMMU
- I/O ports
- IoReadIoPort8(), IoReadIoPort16(), IoReadIoPort32()
- IoReadIoPortBuffer8(), IoReadIoPortBuffer16(), IoReadIoPortBuffer32()
- IoWriteIoPort8(), IoWriteIoPort16(), IoWriteIoPort32()
- IoWriteIoPortBuffer8(), IoWriteIoPortBuffer16(), IoWriteIoPortBuffer32()
- KnIoPermitPort()
- KnRegisterPort8(), KnRegisterPort16(), KnRegisterPort32()
- KnRegisterPorts()
- Memory-mapped I/O (MMIO)
- Interrupts
- Deallocating resources
- Time
- Queues
- Memory barriers
- Receiving information about CPU time and memory usage
- Sending and receiving IPC messages
- POSIX support
- MessageBus component
- Return codes
- libkos library
- Building a KasperskyOS-based solution
- Developing security policies
- Formal specifications of KasperskyOS-based solution components
- Describing a security policy for a KasperskyOS-based solution
- General information about a KasperskyOS-based solution security policy description
- PSL language syntax
- Describing the global parameters of a KasperskyOS-based solution security policy
- Including PSL files
- Including EDL files
- Creating security model objects
- Binding methods of security models to security events
- Describing security audit profiles
- Describing and performing tests for a KasperskyOS-based solution security policy
- PSL data types
- Examples of binding security model methods to security events
- Example descriptions of basic security policies for KasperskyOS-based solutions
- Example descriptions of security audit profiles
- Example descriptions of tests for KasperskyOS-based solution security policies
- KasperskyOS Security models
- Pred security model
- Bool security model
- Math security model
- Struct security model
- Base security model
- Regex security model
- HashSet security model
- StaticMap security model
- StaticMap security model object
- StaticMap security model init rule
- StaticMap security model fini rule
- StaticMap security model set rule
- StaticMap security model commit rule
- StaticMap security model rollback rule
- StaticMap security model get expression
- StaticMap security model get_uncommited expression
- Flow security model
- Mic security model
- Methods of KasperskyOS core endpoints
- Virtual memory endpoint
- I/O endpoint
- Threads endpoint
- Handles endpoint
- Processes endpoint
- Synchronization endpoint
- File system endpoints
- Time endpoint
- Hardware abstraction layer endpoint
- XHCI controller management endpoint
- Audit endpoint
- Profiling endpoint
- I/O memory management endpoint
- Connections endpoint
- Power management endpoint
- Notifications endpoint
- Hypervisor endpoint
- Trusted Execution Environment endpoints
- IPC interrupt endpoint
- CPU frequency management endpoint
- Security patterns for development under KasperskyOS
- Appendices
- Additional examples
- hello example
- echo example
- ping example
- net_with_separate_vfs example
- net2_with_separate_vfs example
- embedded_vfs example
- embed_ext2_with_separate_vfs example
- multi_vfs_ntpd example
- multi_vfs_dns_client example
- multi_vfs_dhcpcd example
- mqtt_publisher (Mosquitto) example
- mqtt_subscriber (Mosquitto) example
- gpio_input example
- gpio_output example
- gpio_interrupt example
- gpio_echo example
- koslogger example
- pcre example
- messagebus example
- I2c_ds1307_rtc example
- iperf_separate_vfs example
- Uart example
- spi_check_regs example
- barcode_scanner example
- perfcnt example
- Additional examples
- Licensing the application
- Data provision
- Information about third-party code
- Trademark notices
Methods of KasperskyOS core endpoints
From the perspective of the Kaspersky Security Module, the KasperskyOS kernel is a container of components that provide endpoints. The list of kernel components is provided in the Core.edl
file located in the sysroot-*-kos/include/kl/core
directory of the KasperskyOS SDK. This directory also contains the CDL and IDL files for the formal specification of the kernel.
Methods of core endpoints can be divided into secure methods and potentially dangerous methods. Potentially dangerous methods could be used by a cybercriminal in a compromised solution component to cause a denial of service, set up covert data transfer, or hijack an I/O device. Secure methods cannot be used for these purposes.
Access to methods of core endpoints must be restricted as much as possible by the solution security policy (according to the least privilege principle). For that, the following requirements must be fulfilled:
- Access to a secure method must be granted only to the solution components that require this method.
- Access to a potentially dangerous method must be granted only to the trusted solution components that require this method.
- Access to a potentially dangerous method must be granted to untrusted solution components that require this method only if the verifiable access conditions limit the possibilities of malicious use of this method, or if the impact from malicious use of this method is acceptable from a security perspective.
For example, an untrusted component may be allowed to use a limited set of I/O ports that do not allow this component to take control of I/O devices. In another example, covert data transfer between untrusted components may be acceptable from a security perspective.
In this section Hardware abstraction layer endpoint XHCI controller management endpoint I/O memory management endpoint |